The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, ruling that police officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep of a vehicle during a traffic stop. The stop, initiated for minor violations, quickly escalated due to the driver’s gang affiliation, the high-crime location, and the suspicious arrival of an associate.
The case centers on Antoan Raban, who was pulled over in Denver after police observed his car missing a front license plate and failing to signal a turn. During the stop, officers discovered Raban was a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and was driving through territory controlled by a rival gang, the Bloods—a situation officers found particularly alarming given recent local violence.
Raban’s situation became more complex when, just seconds into the stop, a known Crip gang member with a violent history, Deshay Armstrong, drove past, executed a three-point turn, and parked across the street, subsequently calling Raban’s phone. This immediate escalation prompted officers to call for backup, bringing the total number of officers on scene to six.
Because Raban lacked identification, officers decided to fingerprint him to confirm his identity. After Raban exited the vehicle and was frisked (yielding no weapons), one officer conducted a “protective sweep” of the car. This search uncovered a loaded handgun under the driver’s seat and ammunition in the center console. Raban was subsequently charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon.
Challenging the Protective Sweep
Raban moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the protective sweep violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Under established precedent, specifically *Michigan v. Long*, a protective sweep requires officers to have reasonable suspicion of two things: first, that the suspect is currently dangerous, and second, that the suspect may gain immediate access to weapons in the car.
The district court initially denied the motion, finding sufficient justification for the first prong (dangerousness) based on the totality of the circumstances. However, the court expressed skepticism regarding the second prong (weapon access), doubting the officers’ testimony that they intended to release Raban with only a citation, given his lack of a license and the presence of an open beer can.
Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed course on its credibility finding concerning the officers’ intent. It ultimately concluded that the officers *could* have reasonably believed they would release Raban with a citation, meaning he might have returned to the car and accessed weapons. This final ruling allowed the evidence to stand, leading to Raban’s conditional guilty plea and this appeal.
The Tenth Circuit Weighs the Evidence
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo (afresh) while accepting its factual findings. The court found that the government successfully met its burden of proof for both prongs of the *Long* test.
1. Raban Posed a Present Danger
The appellate court agreed that the combination of factors created reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous:
* Gang Affiliation: Raban’s face tattoos identifying him as a Crips member, combined with the officers’ specialized training, provided an objective basis for believing he was currently associated with the gang.
* Location: The stop occurred in a high-crime area known for violent gang activity, specifically involving Crips and their rivals, the Bloods. Raban being in rival territory heightened this concern.
* Armstrong’s Presence: The sudden arrival of Armstrong—a known, violent Crip member with a personal connection to Raban—who then parked nearby, called Raban, and watched the stop, significantly raised officer safety concerns. The court noted that officers reasonably perceived this as more than innocent observation, especially given the risk of gang interference during a stop.
* Ankle Monitor: The court gave this factor minimal weight, as the officer who conducted the initial frisk was unaware of the reason for the monitor and Raban’s criminal history at that time.
Taken together, the court found these elements surpassed a mere “hunch,” establishing a reasonable suspicion that Raban was presently dangerous.
2. Potential for Immediate Weapon Access
The second prong required the officers to reasonably believe Raban might access a weapon. The court focused on the scenario where a suspect is not arrested and is permitted to return to their vehicle.
The central issue here was the district court’s finding that Officer Danielson reasonably believed Raban would be released with a citation, despite lacking a license and having an open container. Raban argued that the presence of six officers and these violations should have led to an arrest, thus negating the need for a sweep based on re-entry.
The Tenth Circuit, however, deferred to the district court’s ultimate finding that Danielson reasonably believed Raban would be released to the car (perhaps to wait for a ride). Crucially, the court noted that in Colorado, driving without a license or having an open container are generally civil, not criminal, offenses that would not mandate an arrest.
The court contrasted this situation with a prior case where the defendant had a revoked license (a criminal offense), confirming that in Raban’s case, there was no legal basis for detention beyond the initial traffic infractions until the gun was found. Therefore, the belief that Raban would return to the car to retrieve belongings or wait for a ride provided the necessary justification for the protective sweep.
The appeals court concluded that because officers reasonably suspected Raban was dangerous and might access weapons upon returning to his car, the protective sweep was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The district court’s suppression ruling was therefore affirmed, upholding Raban’s conviction.