The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that individuals whose drug possession convictions were overturned following the landmark *State v. Blake* decision are not entitled to state reimbursement for the value of community service hours used to satisfy their court-imposed financial obligations (LFOs). The denial of reimbursement for this labor, unlike cash payments, did not violate the petitioners’ constitutional right to equal protection of the law, according to the majority opinion.
The consolidated case involved Sabra Danielson and Simone Nelson, both of whom pleaded guilty to felony drug possession charges years ago. After the Supreme Court invalidated these convictions in 2021 under *Blake*, they sought to vacate their records and recover all associated LFOs they had paid, either through cash or community service.
The State agreed to refund the cash payments, but opposed reimbursement for the labor performed by Nelson and Danielson. The trial courts agreed with the State, vacating the convictions but denying reimbursement for the value assigned to their community service hours. Nelson and Danielson argued this distinction amounted to wealth-based discrimination in violation of equal protection guarantees.
The Majority’s Stance: No Established Right to Labor Reimbursement
Writing for the majority, Justice Madsen affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, concluding that Nelson and Danielson failed to meet the threshold requirement for an equal protection claim: demonstrating a right to reimbursement for labor performed in lieu of cash payments.
The Court examined the petitioners’ reliance on *Nelson v. Colorado*, a U.S. Supreme Court case that dealt with due process rights for recovering funds paid under overturned convictions. The Washington Supreme Court majority found *Nelson* to be narrowly focused, recognizing a private interest in recovering *money* paid to the State.
“Contrary to Nelson’s and Danielson’s claim, *Nelson* does not identify a right—fundamental or otherwise—to be reimbursed for community service work performed in satisfaction of LFOs,” the opinion stated. The Court noted that Nelson and Danielson *were* reimbursed for the cash portions of their LFOs, satisfying the due process considerations recognized in the federal precedent.
Furthermore, the majority rejected the argument that the petitioners were members of a semi-suspect class (the poor) treated disparately. They contended that the option to perform community service in lieu of cash payments—often allowed under statutes permitting courts to modify payment methods for those facing “manifest hardship”—is not explicitly limited to indigent individuals.
The petitioners argued that, in practice, only those unable to afford cash would opt for community service. However, the Court found this was merely an assumption. Establishing an equal protection violation requires demonstrating actual disparate treatment, and the petitioners failed to show that wealthier individuals chose community service over cash payments.
Finally, the Court questioned whether sufficient “state action” was present regarding the community service, as Danielson’s work was performed for non-profit organizations, not directly for the State. Because the petitioners failed to establish a constitutional right to labor reimbursement, disparate treatment, or class membership, the Court found it unnecessary to determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.
The Dissenting Views: Wealth Discrimination and Fundamental Fairness
Two justices dissented, arguing vigorously that denying reimbursement for labor was a clear violation of equal protection principles, particularly when viewed through the lens of wealth-based discrimination.
Justice Mungia authored the primary dissent, supported in part by Justice Yu, detailing the severe collateral consequences of LFO debt, which disproportionately burden the poor. Justice Mungia argued that the two groups—those who paid LFOs in cash and those who paid via court-credited community service—are “similarly situated” in that both groups satisfied court-ordered financial obligations arising from invalid convictions.
“Denying reimbursements for LFO debts satisfied through community service, while allowing reimbursement for those who paid with cash, is indeed wealth-based discrimination,” Justice Mungia wrote. The dissent emphasized that community service in these cases was almost always a necessity born out of “manifest hardship,” not a preferred choice, citing evidence that courts typically allow such alternatives only when defendants cannot pay cash.
Justice Mungia argued that the state action (the court’s refusal to refund service value) should be subject to intermediate scrutiny because it burdened an important right (reimbursement) based on a semi-suspect classification (wealth status), citing prior Washington case law (*Phelan*, *Mota*). The dissent asserted that the State failed to show a substantial governmental interest in treating cash payers and labor providers differently. Even under the lowest standard, rational basis review, the distinction was irrational because the State’s interest in conserving funds is not a legitimate basis for discrimination when the underlying debt itself was voided.
Justice Yu, while concurring in the result of the dissent, expressed reluctance to expand current federal due process and equal protection doctrines, preferring to leave the issue to the legislature for policy reform.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals, leaving the LFO credits earned through community service unrefunded.